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The democratic movement in Russia has ceased to exist, at least in the form we have 
known since the early 1990s.  This is a regrettable fact, but it must be acknowledged in 
order to begin the revival of democracy in Russia.
 
In a very general sense, the reasons for this defeat are as follows:
 
Objective Reasons:  The collapse of the USSR and the inevitable economic reforms 
that followed, led to a declining standard of living for both citizens and the state.  This 
process coincided with the introduction of democratic values and processes into the 
lives of the populace.  Democracy, therefore, became linked in the Russian psyche to 
the negative impact of the times: the decrease in material well-being, the destruction of 
the familiar routine and lifestyle, collapse of the “great power” state, etc.  Given these 
associations, the publicπs esteem for democracy naturally suffered setbacks, but, in 
principle, not insurmountable blows.  The complications that arose for the democratic 
movement were not the results of objective circumstances, but rather of subjective 
factors, notably the specific manner in which these reforms were implemented.
 
In the beginning of the 1990s, the authorities made a strategic error.  Reforms, which 
were heralded as liberal and democratic, in fact were enacted at the expense of social 
support for the individual, actually, at the expense of democracy.  At a certain moment, 
the decision was made to adopt a strategic course toward a “comprehensive market,” 
which, it was hoped, would regulate and repair every glitch by itself.  Some thought that  
market forces have managed this task well:  After all, the Great Depression in the USA 
was the result of the achievement of a market equilibrium.  What we forgot, when we 
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pinned our hopes on the market, was that market mechanisms have no moral 
dimension; they are indifferent to the needs of people.  Markets cannot be fair or unfair, 
they can only be either effective or ineffective.  We looked to western examples for our 
model, but there was no abstract market in the West, they have developed a social 
market economy, which is a very complex and delicate mechanism; this economy does 
not spring forth from pure market forces on its own.  Our course of reforms (and in 
particular the method of carrying out privatization and the instant devaluation of the 
savings deposits of the population) actually blocked the creation of a social market 
economy, which, consequently, hampered the construction of a developed liberal-
democratic political system.
 
The third set of factors in the decline of the democratic movement involves 
personalities, and the personal ambitions of leaders of the movement, multiplied by the 
ideological differences among them.  Aside from the fact that Yavlinksy and Chubais 
had difficulties agreeing on a personal level, they also had different understandings of 
democracy:  For Chubais, democracy is an instrument for supporting a market 
economy, whereas for Yavlinksky (as well as for me) democracy is, by itself, an absolute 
value, which protects individual freedom.
 
All of the abovementioned factors undoubtedly weakened the democratic movement.  In 
this situation, forces, which considered themselves democratic, yielded to the 
temptation of “political technologies,” which are those elements that constitute the 
veneer of democracy (often including elections), rather than concerning themselves with 
the real problems of civil society.  Such an approach produced results for a while:  
Democrats managed to imitate the appearance of influencing society, which, as a result, 
allowed them (for a time) to receive the necessary percentages during elections.
 
However, with Vladimir Putinπs coming to power, the essence of their attitudes toward 
political technologies changed.  The people had been offered these technologies, these 
surface replications of democracy, for such a long time that, instead of real politics (and 
by real politics I mean real communication among citizens regarding their government – 
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not with the government, but more precisely, about the government), they simply made 
a technological, not a political choice.  That is why voters selected the most effective 
technology ­– the administrative resource, which incorporates familiar patterns of 
communication, such as personal contacts, status,  money, and even the efficiency of 
the security services, to regulate social and political interaction.  With that choice, the 
whole weakness of the democratic movement, enervated by the burden of past 
mistakes, “suddenly” was revealed.  As a result, an “electoral default” and a political 
market crash took place.  This default, first and foremost, “devaluated the deposits” of 
the democrats and the communists, but it would have ramifications for a large army of 
political analysts.  The latter can simply be left without jobs:  Why pay money for 
exquisite “technological lace,” when primitive “administrative sackcloth” solves 
everything.
 
There is only one way out of this situation: finally to face civil society, and stop the 
constant complaining about it being weak and underdeveloped.  Let us begin with the 
fact that civil society exists, and that it lives its own life, trying somehow to adjust to 
modern conditions.  It is a real society with real problems to the extent that it is a 
collection of individuals confronting similar problems within the same environment.  Do 
not attempt to fence yourself off from society through the use of political technologies 
because this is not only dishonorable, it is ineffective. Thus far, the technologies of 
democracy have failed to reflect or to assist Russian civil society and therefore have 
been discredited. If politics is the art of the possible, then democratic politicians in 
modern Russia are possible only when they express the real interests of genuine civil 
society. In order to represent these interests, politicians must have institutions that have 
the legitimacy and authority to both hear and enact real change, so that citizens might 
see results; those who have become disillusioned must be engaged and convinced, 
again, that politics is not the market: one does not buy, but chooses in politics.  This task 
is extremely difficult, but without attempting to solve it, real democracy in Russia has no 
future.
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